We hypothesize that individual investors treat trading as a fun and exciting gambling activity, implying substitution between this activity and alternative gambling opportunities. To examine this hypothesis, we study the lottery jackpots and the trading of individual investors in Taiwan. When the jackpots exceed 500 million Taiwan dollars, the trading volume decreases between 5.2% and 9.1% among stocks preferred by individual investors and between 6.8% and 8.6% among lottery-like stocks. The decline in individual buy volume is statistically indistinct from the decline in sell volume. Large jackpots are associated with less trading in options with high sensitivity to volatility. (JEL G11, G14, G15, H31) Do individual investors enjoy trading in the stock market, treating it like a form of fun and exciting gambling activity? In this paper, we hypothesize that some individual investors reduce their trading in stocks on large jackpot days because gambling in the lottery brings fun and excitement, similar to that of buying and selling stocks. We refer to the above hypothesis as the "fun and excitement" hypothesis, and we test its implications by studying repeated natural experiments of large jackpot lotteries in Taiwan. The key empirical finding is that individual investors trade less on large jackpot days or, equivalently, that there is a substitution effect between stock trading and lottery participation.
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We hypothesize that individual investors treat trading as a fun and exciting gambling activity, implying substitution between this activity and alternative gambling opportunities. To examine this hypothesis, we study the lottery jackpots and the trading of individual investors in Taiwan. When the jackpots exceed 500 million Taiwan dollars, the trading volume decreases between 5.2% and 9.1% among stocks preferred by individual investors and between 6.8% and 8.6% among lottery-like stocks. The decline in individual buy volume is statistically indistinct from the decline in sell volume. Large jackpots are associated with less trading in options with high sensitivity to volatility. (JEL G11, G14, G15, H31) Do individual investors enjoy trading in the stock market, treating it like a form of fun and exciting gambling activity? In this paper, we hypothesize that some individual investors reduce their trading in stocks on large jackpot days because gambling in the lottery brings fun and excitement, similar to that of buying and selling stocks. We refer to the above hypothesis as the "fun and excitement" hypothesis, and we test its implications by studying repeated natural experiments of large jackpot lotteries in Taiwan. The key empirical finding is that individual investors trade less on large jackpot days or, equivalently, that there is a substitution effect between stock trading and lottery participation. economic activities that are unlikely to be venues for individuals to enjoy trading.
A possible alternative explanation of the substitution effect is that a large jackpot is attractive to some investors because of the financial risk exposure that it provides, that is, a small probability of a large payoff in exchange for an upfront cost. When a large jackpot induces some investors to buy lottery tickets, they reduce their net positions in stocks, with buy volume declining more than sell volume. We refer to the aforementioned explanation as the "financial risk exposure" hypothesis, and we test it by using individual buy and sell volume. Our evidence indicates that the decline in individual buy volume is statistically at par with the decline in sell volume on large jackpot days. This result is inconsistent with the financial risk exposure hypothesis and is in favor of the interpretation that buying stocks is as fun and exciting as selling stocks.
Furthermore, we explore two ramifications of the finding that trading volume declines on large jackpot days. First, large jackpots reduce the stock liquidity, as evidenced by an increase in the average closing bid-ask spread. Second, we consider the pricing implications of large jackpot lotteries through a trading strategy and do not find reliable pricing effects.
How does Taiwan offer a suitable laboratory in which to investigate the relation between lottery jackpots and individual trading activities? First, the availability of daily buy and sell trading volume of individual investors allows us to examine an alternative hypothesis that investors substitute between stocks and lotteries because both offer similar risk exposure to investors. Second, the nationwide lottery in Taiwan has been popular since its inception in 2002, and it is the only legal form of gambling for most of our sample period. When the lottery jackpot is large, it becomes a salient form of fun and exciting gambling alternative to stock trading among some investors. Third, on average, about 70% of the trading volume in the Taiwan stock market originates from individual investors, as opposed to other major markets in which institutional investors typically dominate. Additionally, large jackpots can be viewed as a series of natural experiments because (1) the jackpot accumulates when there is no winner of a lottery drawing and (2) a large jackpot occurs randomly and is unlikely to be related to other aspects of the economic environment.
The collection of evidence implying that investors seem to trade stocks as a fun and exciting gambling activity is related to studies showing that sensation seeking and entertainment could be reasons to trade stocks. For example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) analyze Finnish investor tax filings, driving records, and mandatory psychological profiles and conclude that investors who are sensation seeking and overconfident trade more frequently. Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) show that German investors who self-report as enjoying investing also rebalance their portfolios more often.
Our study is also linked to research that suggests that the gambling desire could influence stock trading. Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009, Section 4) show that the introduction of the lottery was associated with a decline in stock market turnover by about one-fourth, and they argue that the gambling desire encourages individual investors to trade. Kumar (2009) connects the propensity to gamble with investment decision making and shows that state lotteries and lottery-type stocks attract similar socioeconomic clienteles. 1 In a related study, Dorn, Dorn, and Sengmueller (2013) document, first, that there is a negative relation between U.S. multistate lotteries and small trades in the U.S. stock market, and second, that discount brokerage clients in California and Germany are less likely to trade during weeks with larger lottery prizes. Our study differs from theirs in a number of ways. Importantly, we provide evidence that the substitution effect between stocks and lotteries appears consistent with the fun and excitement hypothesis, and we reject the financial risk exposure hypothesis. Moreover, we highlight the finding that the substitution effect is present among stocks preferred by individual investors and among index options that exhibit high sensitivity to return volatility. Our analysis provides the additional insight that return skewness, not variance, is a determinant of the substitution effect between stocks and lotteries. Finally, we explore whether large jackpots impact stock liquidity and whether they have pricing effects.
Hypothesis Development
Our focus is on studying repeated natural experiments in which the presence of a lottery with a potentially large payoff serves as a proxy for days when individual investors' need for fun and exciting gambling activities is fulfilled by participating in the lottery. The argument is that the thrill of winning a large jackpot lottery, perhaps intensified by media coverage and investor attention around the event, substitutes some individual investors' need to trade in the stock market and thereby decreases their trading volume.
The following testable prediction stems from investors having a taste for a fun and exciting gambling activity that causes a substitution between stock trading and lottery participation:
Fun and excitement hypothesis: Among the stocks that are fun and exciting for individual investors to buy or sell, we hypothesize a substitution effect between stock trading and lottery participation when the lottery jackpot is large. Moreover, a large jackpot lottery exerts a negative impact on the trading volume of individual investors at the firm level and in the aggregate.
The fun and excitement hypothesis emphasizes that there are individual investors for whom the mere act of trading stocks is fun and exciting. The studies of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) and Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) support the notion that some investors consider trading as a form of a fun and exciting gambling activity.
When the lottery jackpot is large, do investors tend to buy lottery tickets rather than trade stocks because the two serve as substitute sources of fun and excitement or because the lottery draws their attention away from trading stocks? 2 The attention explanation of the substitution effect results from investors reallocating their attention toward activities that are fun and exciting. At a conceptual level, if a large jackpot fails to generate attention, then investors are unlikely to substitute buying lottery tickets for trading stocks. From this perspective, the attention explanation of the decline in stock trading on large jackpot days and the fun and excitement hypothesis go hand-in-hand and can be difficult to disentangle. Therefore, we focus on the predictions of the fun and excitement hypothesis and do not attempt to distinguish between the two explanations of the substitution effect between stocks and lotteries.
We consider an alternative hypothesis, which provides another explanation for the decline in the trading volume when the lottery jackpot is large.
Financial risk exposure hypothesis: Some individual investors replace stocks with a large jackpot lottery because both yield a similar financial risk exposure, namely, a small probability of a large payoff. The prediction is that large jackpot lotteries are associated with a stronger decline in individual buy volume than the decline in individual sell volume.
The financial risk exposure hypothesis could be traced to the idea that some investors view stocks as lotteries, (e.g., Barberis and Huang (2008) ; Kumar (2009 , Table III) ; Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011 , Table 1); and Green and  Hwang (2012, Table 3) ). A large jackpot will lead investors to reduce their net positions in stocks. The implication is that there will be more selling than buying, thereby producing an asymmetrical impact of large jackpots on the individual buy and sell volume. Importantly, the fun and excitement hypothesis offers a contrasting implication that the decline in buy volume is indistinguishable from the decline in sell volume because both buying and selling stocks can generate fun and excitement for individual investors.
Explanation of Natural Experiments and Description of Data Sources
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The lottery and large jackpots
Our analysis combines three nationwide lotteries in Taiwan, namely, Lotto, Big Lotto, and Super Lotto. The media usually reports the cumulated prize of a lottery drawing as its jackpot, so we use the two terms, cumulated prize and jackpot, interchangeably. The institutional details of the lotteries are described in Table Online-I, whereas Table 1 The data is handcollected from the web site of the bank that holds the rights to administer the lottery. In our framework, a large jackpot is defined to be a cumulated lottery prize above 500 million TWD (around 15 million U.S. dollars), which roughly represents the 90th percentile value of the sample. In total, there are 163 large jackpot lotteries above 500 million TWD. These large jackpots only occur after a series of no winners. In particular, a large jackpot occurs randomly and is unlikely to be driven by factors that affect the stock market. Therefore, we regard these 163 large jackpots as a series of natural experiments and use them to test the fun and excitement hypothesis.
Another way to assess the fun and excitement hypothesis is to analyze the relationship between lottery sales and stock trading by individual investors. Our contention is that large jackpots and large lottery sales both could help to identify an event when some individual investors switch from trading in the stock market to buying the lottery. Mirroring our definition of a large jackpot, we define a large sales lottery as a lottery whose total sales (per lottery drawing) exceed 500 million TWD.
Individual investor trading volume
Our stock trading data is from Taiwan Economic Journal containing 734 stocks on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) and excludes firms with fewer than 100 trading days. Unlike many other stock exchanges, the TWSE provides the daily number of shares bought and sold by institutional investors, allowing us to construct the daily individual investors' buy and sell volume of each stock. The buy and sell volume enables us to distinguish between our two hypotheses, that is, whether individual investors trade stocks as a fun and exciting gambling activity or whether they replace stocks with lotteries because both provide similar financial risk exposure.
Appendix A describes the two approaches we adopt to construct the data on individual buy and sell trading volume. Our implementation assumes that when there is a transaction between an institution and an individual, it is classified as institutional trading volume. Table A1 reports the median of daily trading activity variables. A feature of the data worth emphasizing is that the trading in the Taiwan stock market is dominated by individual investors. For instance, the ratio of shares traded by individual investors over total shares traded ranges between 52% and 76% (obtained by dividing the number in column 3 by the number in column 2).
Lottery sales divided by the daily value of shares traded are fairly small, averaging around 0.2%. In addition, the average minimum transaction value is 20,000 TWD (minimum lot size of 1,000 shares times an average stock price of 20 TWD), which is equivalent to 400 (200) Lotto and Big Lotto (Super Lotto) tickets. Both examples illustrate that the size of the lottery market is small in comparison to the transaction value in the stock market.
Our Evidence Favors the Fun and Excitement Hypothesis
This section examines the central features of the fun and excitement hypothesis, and we study a series of large jackpots to address the following questions: (1) Does the presence of large jackpots reduce shares traded for stocks that are preferred by individual investors? (2) Is the skewness an important driver of the substitution effect between stocks and lotteries? (3) How pronounced is the substitution effect if the variance, instead of the skewness, is used to identify lottery-like stocks? (4) How robust is the substitution effect between the lottery and shares traded if we use alternative cutoff values to define a large jackpot? (5) Do large jackpots impact the trading volume at the firm level, and is the effect also discernible at the stock market level? (6) Do securities with inherently skewed payoffs, such as options, experience a decline in trading volume on large jackpot days? 3.1 Empirical approach and the description of stocks that are fun and exciting to trade The substitution effect between stocks and lotteries is likely to concentrate on the stocks that are fun and exciting for individual investors to trade. Appendix B describes our selection of the set of stock characteristics, and we group them along the following two dimensions:
(1) Stocks preferred by individual investors: We identify such stocks as those with high individual trading fraction, high past returns, high reciprocal of market capitalization (i.e., low market capitalization), high reciprocal of earnings-per-share (EPS), or high market-to-book (M/B). We note that stocks with high reciprocal of EPS are firms with low EPS, including those with negative EPS. (2) Lottery-like stocks: We characterize such stocks as those with high skewness. In our implementation, skewness is captured in three ways:
(1) the conventional measure of skewness (third-central moment divided by the standard deviation cubed), (2) the mean minus the median divided by the standard deviation (denoted by 3(Mean−Median)/STD, which is the Pearson's median skewness coefficient), and (3) up-to-down volatility, computed as −log(
, where r it is daily return for stock i and n u (n d ) represents the number of days when the daily return is higher (lower) relative to the period mean. Our up-to-down volatility variable is the negative of DUVOL it in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001, Equation (2)).
Each day we sort stocks by a stock characteristic into three parts, each representing the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of the sample. We then sum the number of shares traded across all stocks in each of the three groups and label them as high (H ), medium (M), and low (L). We repeat this procedure each day in the sample and construct the corresponding time series of the trading volume. Our rationale is that trading the stocks in the high group could generate fun and excitement similar to that offered by gambling in the lottery.
To take an initial look at our data, we adopt an event study approach to analyze the individual trading volume around large jackpot days for stocks with high individual trading fraction, high past returns, and high conventional skewness. We consider a large jackpot day (say, January 22, 2002) and denote the trading volume by V 0 . Let V ±j be the trading volume on adjacent trading days for j up to 2, or 10. Figure 1 displays the average log(V ±j ), with the standard errors represented by the •-curve. For comparison, we also compute the average log trading volume on other days outside the respective event window (the far-left bars labeled "Others"). First, the average trading in the [−2,+2] window around large jackpot days is lower than that from "Others." Second, the averages of log(V −10 ) and log(V +10 ) appear close to "Others." The test of the hypothesis that the average of log(V −10 ) or log(V +10 ) is different from "Others" is rejected with a minimum p-value of 0.24 among the three groups, using the Newey and West (1987) 
Figure 1
Individual trading volume around large jackpot days We consider a large jackpot day and denote the individual trading volume by V 0 . Let V ±j be the individual trading volume on adjacent trading days for j up to 2, or 10. We present the average log(V ±j ), whereas the far-left bars are the average of the log of the individual trading volume on other days outside of the respective event window, labeled as "Others." The •-curve represents the corresponding standard error. In our illustration, we focus on stocks with high individual trading fraction, high past returns, and high conventional skewness.
To further understand the relationship between trading volume and large jackpots, we rely on the multivariate regression analysis with explicit controls:
where V H,t and V L,t are the number of shares traded by individual investors corresponding to the high and low groups within a stock characteristic. In specification (1), V H, [t−22→t−1] and V L, [t−22→t−1] are the averages of lagged trading volume between day t −22 to t −1 pertaining to the same stock characteristic. We add the lagged terms to control for possible persistence in trading volume. 3 Specification (1) embeds two additional sets of controls. Following (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001 , Table V) , we include day-of-the-week dummies, with Friday as the base, to capture intraweek trading patterns. Next, we include the log changes in the Taiwan unemployment rate and the log changes in the coincident index to control for the potential impact of the macroeconomic conditions on stock trading. 4 ε H,t and ε L,t are zero-mean disturbance terms, and they are allowed to be correlated.
At the heart of our approach is D
J ackpot t
, which represents a dummy variable for a large jackpot and equals unity when the jackpot size is larger than 500 million TWD, and zero otherwise. The large jackpot dummy is meant to capture the days when an investor's desire for a fun and exciting gambling activity is satisfied by buying lottery tickets.
We perform seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) and examine whether shares traded on day t are affected by the large jackpot on the same day. Importantly, the SUR allows us to simultaneously examine the effect of a large jackpot on the trading volume of the high and low groups within each stock characteristic. The fun and excitement hypothesis is captured by the following restriction:
A negative, and statistically significant, coefficient before D
for the high group (β H,1 ) would support a substitution effect between stocks and lotteries; that is, a large jackpot is associated with reduced trading in stocks. Moreover, a related hypothesis is whether a large jackpot exerts a differential impact on the trading volume of the high and low groups within a stock characteristic:
can be tested via the Wald test. The adopted procedure is essentially equivalent to independent variables interacting with a low group dummy, but the SUR specification facilitates hypothesis testing in a multiple equation setting. Table 2 reports the large jackpot dummy coefficients, and the p-values are based on the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation Estimation results are based on the SUR specification (as in Equation (1)) for the system of equations:
Large jackpots negatively impact trading in stocks preferred by individual investors
The dependent variable is the log of the shares traded by individual investors, and the "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The unemployment rate and the coincident index are linearly interpolated to daily values using monthly data. The number of shares traded by individual investors is measured for each of the following stock characteristics: (1) individual trading fraction, (2) past returns, (3) reciprocal of market capitalization, (4) reciprocal of earnings per share (EPS), and (5) market-to-book (M/B). Each day we divide the ordered distribution of stocks by the characteristic into three parts, each respectively representing the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of the sample. Stocks with high reciprocal of EPS are firms with low EPS, including those with negative EPS. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994 consistent (HAC) covariance matrix estimator. 5 Our procedure relies on the Bartlett kernel and no prewhitening, with lag length selected automatically, according to Newey and West (1994) . The two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses. For brevity, we do not report the coefficients before the controls and intercepts in specification (1) in our main tables, but Table Online-III tabulates the coefficient estimates across a set of stock characteristics. For stocks with high individual trading fraction (see panel A of Table 2 ), the number of shares traded by individual investors declines by 5.2% on a large jackpot day. Based on a p-value of 0.07, one can reject the null hypothesis that the lottery has zero effect on the shares traded. In contrast, the coefficient before the large jackpot dummy is 0.004 for stocks with low individual trading fraction. With a p-value of 0.88, this effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The χ 2 test statistic for the hypothesis that β H,1 = β L,1 in Equation (3) generates a p-value of 0.03. This implies that the magnitude of the coefficient before the large jackpot dummy for the high individual trading fraction stock group is statistically more negative than its low counterpart. In sum, stocks whose trading activity is dominated by individual investors experience a deterioration in shares traded when the lottery jackpot is large.
A similar overall picture is obtained when considering stocks classified by past returns and reciprocal of market capitalization (as in panels B and C of Table 2 ). In particular, the reduction in trading volume among stocks with high past returns is 9.1% (with a p-value of 0.01), and the magnitude is statistically more negative than that of stocks with low past returns (the χ 2 statistic has a p-value of 0.00).
An analogous substitution effect is observed among stocks with high reciprocal of EPS and high M/B (panels D and E of Table 2 ). With an average EPS of −0.57, the firms in the high reciprocal of EPS category are essentially loss firms and could be alluring to individual investors. Additionally, growth stocks are often at the forefront of incipient technologies with uncertain valuations and could be thrilling for individual investors to trade.
Summarizing our findings, the negative effect of large jackpots on individual trading volume is consistently stronger among stocks preferred by individual investors. The β H,1 estimates are negative and statistically significant (the highest p-value is 0.07), and this evidence concurs with the predictions of the fun and excitement hypothesis.
Evidence from lottery-like stocks is supportive of the fun and excitement hypothesis
In this subsection, we investigate the link between individual investors' preference for stocks with lottery features, trading activities, and the lottery jackpot. More specifically, if lotteries are designed to be fun and exciting, and the skewness attribute makes lotteries attractive to gamblers, then the skewness should be a determinant of the substitution effect between stock trading and lottery participation. Table 3 reports the results from SUR estimations analogous to those in specification (1). Each skewness measure is estimated based on daily returns over a three-month trailing window. The results are informative from two perspectives. First, the trading volume of stocks associated with high conventional skewness falls by 8.6%, with a p-value of 0.01 on a large jackpot day (see panelA). Moreover, the χ 2 test for the hypothesis that β H,1 = β L,1 yields a p-value of 0.04, suggesting that the coefficient before the large jackpot dummy for the high skewness group is statistically more negative than that of the low skewness group. Second, the same pattern is preserved for stocks associated with high 3(mean−median)/std and high up-to-down volatility, indicating that the substitution effect between stocks and lotteries remains strong among stocks that manifest longer right-tails.
We conduct additional exercises to show that the substitution effect is a robust feature among high skewness stocks. First, we investigate whether the decline in trading volume among lottery-like stocks is pronounced on large jackpot days when the skewness measures are estimated using daily returns over alternative trailing windows ranging from one to 12 months. This exercise is motivated by the view that skewness may be difficult to measure and could be sensitive to the choice of the trailing window. Second, we augment the SUR analysis with a specification in which the dependent variable is the difference in the log of shares traded of the high and low skewness groups:
This single-equation setting complements the SUR specification, keeps the same set of controls as in Equation (1), and uses log(
as an explanatory variable. Our focus is on the null hypothesis φ 1 = 0 versus the alternative, φ 1 < 0. Table 4 displays the φ 1 coefficients, the p-values based on the HAC standard errors, and the corresponding χ 2 statistics from the SUR estimation, along with the p-values. There are two noteworthy results. First, all φ 1 coefficients are negative, and the majority of them are statistically significant. For instance, 10 out of 15 p-values are below 0.1. Second, the results from the single-equation approach are in line with those from the SUR approach, as gauged by the p-values from the χ 2 statistics, affirming that the substitution effect is a stable Estimation results are based on the SUR specification (as in Equation (1)) for the system of equations:
The dependent variable is the log of the shares traded by individual investors, and the "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The unemployment rate and the coincident index are linearly interpolated to daily values using monthly data. Lottery-like stocks are those with high skewness. We use three measures of skewness: (i) the conventional measure of skewness (third-central moment divided by the standard deviation cubed), (ii) the mean minus the median divided by the standard deviation (denoted by 3(mean−median)/std, which is the Pearson's median skewness coefficient), and (iii) up-to-down volatility, which is computed as −log n u −1 DOWN r 2 it / n d −1 UP r 2 it . Our upto-down volatility variable is the negative of DUVOL it in (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2001 , Equation (2)), where r it is daily return for stock i and n u (n d ) represents the number of days when the daily return is higher (lower) relative to the period mean. Each day we divide the ordered distribution of stocks for each skewness measure into three parts, each respectively representing top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of the sample, based on a three-month trailing window, and we sum up the corresponding trading volume. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . The last column reports the χ 2 statistics (with one degree of freedom) and the corresponding two-sided p-values for the hypothesis H 0 : feature across the skewness measures and our choice of trailing windows. The finding that trading volume in lottery-like stocks drops on large jackpot days supports the fun and excitement hypothesis.
Starting with Golec and Tamarkin (1998) , a body of research has attempted to draw a distinction between the variance and skewness attributes of a gamble. Building on this research, Table Online-II first shows that stocks preferred by individual investors are associated with both high skewness and high variance. This observation prompts the following question: is the substitution effect also present among high variance stocks? To answer this question, we adopt a design similar to specification (4), with variance estimated using daily stock returns Table 4 Impact of large jackpots on shares traded by individual investors for stocks with skewness measured over alternative trailing windows Trailing (1)
One-month 
where the dependent variable is the difference between the log of shares traded in the high and low groups of skewness. The departure from Table 3 is that the three skewness measures are computed using daily returns over alternative trailing windows ranging from one to 12 months. The "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided 
where the dependent variable is the difference between the log of shares traded in the high and low groups of return volatility. We compute volatility using daily returns over alternative trailing windows ranging from one to 12 months. The "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values for φ 1 (reported in parentheses) are for the hypothesis H 0 : φ 1 = 0 versus H A : φ 1 < 0. The p-values are based on the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . R 2 is adjusted R 2 .
over alternative trailing windows. The results reported in Table 5 clarify that the decline in trading volume among high variance stocks is not statistically different from the decline in trading volume among low variance stocks. This can be inferred from the p-values higher than 0.49 for the φ 1 coefficients. Overall, our results convey that the variance feature may not be an important driver of the substitution effect. Finally, we examine the impact of large jackpots on the trading volume of lottery-like stocks, while explicitly controlling for variance. To do so, we perform a two-way sort whereby stocks are first divided into two groups by return variance, and then each variance group is divided again into three groups (top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30%) by return skewness. This approach allows us to construct the trading volume among stocks with high and low skewness such that the two groups differ by skewness, but not by variance (further details on the construction of the volume series can be found in the caption to Table 6 ). We perform the SUR estimation (as in Equation (1)) and report the results in Table 6 . Consistent with Table 3 , the large jackpot dummy coefficients remain negative and statistically significant among high skewness stocks. 6 All results here rely on a two-way sort done first on return variance and then on return skewness. Specifically, on each day t, all stocks are sorted into two groups based on their variance computed using a three-month trailing window. Within each variance group, we then divide the ordered distribution of stocks into three skewness groups, each respectively representing 30%, 40%, and 30% of the sample, when the skewness is computed based on a three-month trailing window. Then we sum up the corresponding trading volume of the top (bottom) 30% stocks of both the high and low variance groups to construct the trading volume of the high (low) skewness group on day t. This procedure ensures that the high and low skewness groups have similar variance. Reported estimation results are based on the SUR specification (as in Equation (1)) for the system of equations:
The dependent variable is the log of the shares traded by individual investors, and the "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994 
3.4
The substitution effect is robust to alternative cutoff values of a large jackpot While our evidence broadly supports a substitution effect between stocks and lotteries, one concern is that the 500 million TWD cutoff of a large jackpot might into quintiles based on variance and then divide stocks within each quintile into three skewness groups. Then we construct the corresponding trading volume and perform the SUR estimations analogous to Equation (1). Our results (not reported) confirm the conclusions obtained from Table 6 . Second, we perform a one-way sort of stocks, by their daily residual skewness into three groups (top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30%) and generate the corresponding trading volume series. The residual skewness is obtained from fitting a bivariate time-series regression using daily data, where the skewness (computed using a three-month trailing window) is the dependent variable and the corresponding variance along with lagged skewness (to account for serial dependence) are the independent variables. Our SUR estimation approach reveals that the trading volume declines more prominently among high residual skewness stocks on large jackpot days. be arbitrary. To accommodate this concern, we alter our SUR specification in Equation (1) to consider alternative threshold levels of jackpot sizes of 400, 600, and 700 million TWD, representing the 85th, 92nd, and 95th percentiles of the jackpot distribution, respectively. When the lottery jackpot increases, it translates into fewer large jackpot dummies but often attracts greater media coverage.
Rather than reporting all the coefficient estimates from the SUR estimations, we use Figure 2 to convey the most essential point: when the estimated coefficients on the jackpot dummy are plotted against the size of the jackpot, it reveals a declining pattern. Though not tabulated, 24 (28) out of the 32 p-values are below 0.05 (0.1) for the β H,1 estimates shown in Figure 2 , indicating that the substitution effect is robust to alternative cutoff values of a large jackpot. The effect also varies across stock characteristics. In particular, for stocks with high conventional skewness, the negative impact of the lottery becomes more conspicuous, from −7.3% to −11.7%, as the jackpot increases from 400 million to 700 million TWD.
Still, one may worry about a potential bias when a 1 or 0 dichotomous variable is used in place of a continuous regressor, a point raised by (Rigobon and Stoker, 2009, Section 3) . Hence, we replace D J ackpot t in SUR specification (1) with the lottery jackpot size (in billions of TWD) and study its effect on trading volume in Table 7 . The takeaway is that trading volume responds negatively to the lottery jackpot size. For example, a one-standard-deviation change in the lottery jackpot size (i.e., 267 million TWD) reduces the trading volume by 2.3% among stocks with high conventional skewness.
Further evidence supporting the fun and excitement hypothesis
This subsection provides further evidence that individual investors perceive stocks and lotteries as substitutes for each other. In addition, Appendix C considers the data from lottery sales and over shifting macroeconomic conditions and presents evidence that the substitution effect does not appear to be an artifact of the design or sample. The size of the jackpot is allowed to vary from 400 million TWD to 700 million TWD, and the coefficients are obtained from the SUR estimations (as in Equation (1)). We display the results for both stocks preferred by individual investors and lottery-like stocks.
including both V i, [t−22→t−1] and V m, [t−22→t−1] is to control for the persistence in trading volume and potential unobserved firm heterogeneity. We keep the same set of controls as in Equation (1).
To measure the impact of large jackpots on firm trading volume, we estimate Equation (5) for each firm and summarize our results from three angles. First, All results are based on the SUR specification for the system of equations:
The dependent variable is the log of the shares traded by individual investors, and the "lottery jackpot size," C
J ackpot t
, is the cumulated prize (in billions of TWD). Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . The last column reports the χ 2 statistics (with one degree of freedom) and the corresponding two-sided p-values for the hypothesis H 0 : β H,1 = β L,1 versus H A : β H,1 <β L,1 . Each skewness measure is computed based on daily returns over a three-month trailing window, and we construct the corresponding trading volume as in Table 3. we report the average sensitivity to assess the mean effect. Second, we report the t-statistic for the average sensitivity, under the assumption that the sensitivity coefficients are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across firms. Finally, we count the number of firms that share the same sign as the average sensitivity and have p-values less than 0.05 or 0.1, according to the HAC standard errors. Table 8 shows that a large jackpot has a negative impact on the trading volume by individual investors. The number of shares traded drops, on average, by a statistically significant 7.2% when there is a large jackpot lottery on the same day (see the row marked "Average" for the unrestricted model).
Equally important, there are 107 firms (see the row marked #, p-value < 0.05) that support a negative coefficient on D J ackpot t in the unrestricted model in specification (5) and yet have p-values less than 0.05 associated with β 1,i , according to the HAC standard errors. The number of firms rises to 168 when our criterion is relaxed to p-values less than 0.1. In sum, when the lottery jackpot is large, this alternative form of a fun and exciting gambling activity All results are based on the OLS specification:
The dependent variable is the log of the firm's number of shares traded by individual investors. The "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-theweek dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. Reported are the (1) average of the estimated coefficients, (2) t-statistic on the average coefficient, under the assumption that the coefficients are distributed i.i.d, and (3) #, p-value < 0.05 (and #, p-value < 0.1), which corresponds to the number of coefficients with a p-value less than 0.05 (0.1) and with a sign that is the same as the average coefficient; these are reported in curly brackets, and are based on the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator.
becomes salient and affects the trading behavior of individual investors in a sizable number of individual firms. Table 9 presents results when the dependent variable, denoted by V m,t , is the aggregate trading activities of individual investors:
Large jackpots reduce the aggregate trading activities by individual investors.
where, the average of market trading activities by individual investors between day t −22 to t −1 is denoted by V m, [t−22→t−1] . Our objective is to test whether β 1 < 0.
Panel A of Table 9 shows that a large jackpot exerts a negative impact on the aggregate trading volume by individual investors, whereby the number of shares traded decreases by 4.4% with a p-value of 0.07. To put the above results in perspective, a 4.4% reduction in trading volume by individual investors corresponds to an 85.7 million reduction in number of shares traded (given that the median of daily shares traded is 1.948 billion; see Table A1 ), leading to a 1.71 billion TWD trading value impact (given the median per share price of 
where log(V m,t ) is the log of shares traded in the aggregate (panel A), the log of the total value traded (panel B), or the log of the turnover (panel C), all by individual investors. We calculate the individual turnover as the number of shares traded by individual investors divided by the number of shares outstanding. The "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. V m, [t−22→t−1] is the average trading activity of individual investors in the market during [t −22 → t −1] prior to day t. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The twosided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . R 2 is adjusted R 2 .
20 TWD). Thus, the large jackpot dummy coefficient is both economically and statistically significant. Do our results stay intact if we adopt alternative measures of the aggregate trading volume by individual investors? We address this question in two ways. First, we employ the log of the value traded as a proxy for trading activities. The regression in panel B of Table 9 yields a large jackpot dummy coefficient of −5.5% (with a p-value of 0.03). Second, we use the log of the individual turnover (the number of shares traded by individual investors divided by the number of shares outstanding) and find an analogous effect in panel C of Table 9 . The large jackpot dummy coefficient is −4.5%, and the p-value is 0.06.
Taken all together, the occurrence of a large jackpot significantly reduces the amount of individual trading activities in the stock market. 7 7 If individuals' stock trading data were available and could be matched to their lottery purchase records, it could deliver a more cogent message about the nature of the substitution effect between stocks and lotteries. In addition, our analysis raises further questions of interest: What is the demographic profile of individuals who participate in the lottery? What are their religious beliefs? What are their income profiles? Access to comprehensive demographic data that contain socioeconomic characteristics would enable us to pursue such questions using the methods of Korniotis and Kumar (2011) and Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) . We leave such scrutiny to a follow-up study.
Additional evidence that individual investors may trade for fun and excitement.
The following analyses indicate that the documented substitution effect is likely related to the tendency of individual investors to trade stocks for fun and excitement. First, does the lottery alter the stock trading activities of institutional investors? To answer this question, we use SUR specification (1) and take the dependent variable to be the log of the shares traded by institutional investors. Table A4 shows that while the coefficients on the large jackpot dummy are negative, seven (eight) out of eight large jackpot dummy coefficients have pvalues above 0.1 (0.05). One interpretation of the drop in institutional trading on large jackpot days is that institutions may be accommodating individual investors' desire to trade.
Second, does an alternative attention-grabbing event in the form of a major baseball game, with no gambling component, influence trading volume? Baseball games draw enormous viewership, could be construed as pure attention-grabbing events, and are devoid of a legal gambling venue. Table A5 tabulates the results based on the regression specification:
As opposed to the significantly negative coefficients on the large jackpot dummy in Table 9 , the θ 1 estimates for the baseball game day dummy are positive but insignificant. Although not reported, baseball games do not impact the trading in stocks preferred by individual investors or lottery-like stocks. Overall, the combined evidence highlights that large jackpots are not merely attention-grabbing events, but they also help to reveal that some individual investors may have a taste for fun and exciting gambling activities in the stock market.
Finally, does the lottery have any influence on economic variables outside the stock market? We feature two macroeconomic variables sampled at the daily frequency, that of which possibly comove with major events but are not tied to the occurrence of large jackpots. Specifically, we find that both (1) log changes in the Taiwan|U.S. dollar exchange rate and (2) changes in the implied volatility (the counterpart of the VIX volatility index) of TWSE index options manifest large jackpot dummy coefficients that are insignificant (see Table A6 ). These results appear sensible, as (1) currencies, as opposed to stocks, are typically not viewed as gambling products for individual investors and (2) volatility is not directly traded.
Large jackpots reduce trading among options
Equity options may be regarded as lottery-like products, as they offer access to skewed payoff distributions. Hence, the options market could serve as an additional gambling venue for investors to trade for fun and excitement.
In performing the analysis with equity options, one faces a number of choices, ranging from options on individual stocks, market index, and/or sectors. We focus on the number of contracts traded for TWSE index options because trading in individual stock options is thin, while those in sector options started after 2005, precluding a full sample analysis.
Let S t be the current level of the index and K be the strike price, and define the moneyness of a put (or call) as y t ≡ log(K/S t ) (or log(S t /K)). We omit in-the-money options (i.e., y t > 0) and partition the option sample in three outof-the-money categories: (1) −0.02 ≤ y t < 0, (2) −0.04 ≤ y t < −0.02, and (3) −0.06 ≤ y t < −0.04. As y t decreases, options become more out-of-the-money.
For robustness, we also adopt the moneyness categories in (Bakshi, Cao, and Chen, 1997, Table I ) and (Pan and Poteshman, 2006 , Section 2.3). For instance, when we use −0.03 ≤ y t < 0, −0.06 ≤ y t < −0.03, and y t < −0.06, our conclusions are unchanged.
How could equity index options complement our evidence that some investors enjoy trading as a form of fun and exciting gambling activity? Our approach centers on drawing a distinction between trading in options with moneyness −0.02 ≤ y t < 0, which embed the highest vega, versus options with moneyness −0.06 ≤ y t < −0.04, which embed lower vega (fixing the maturity). In other words, options with moneyness −0.02 ≤ y t < 0 deliver the highest exposure to the underlying return volatility. If some investors in the options market are also susceptible to their desire to trade for fun, they may substitute between lotteries and options with moneyness −0.02 ≤ y t < 0, but this effect should weaken for deeper out-of-the-money options.
Our analysis adopts the following specification:
where V o t represents the daily number of contracts traded for (1) puts and calls, (2) puts alone, and (3) calls alone, specifically for options with maturity up to 30 days (panel A of Table 10 ) and up to 45 days (panel B of Table 10 ), for each of the three moneyness categories. As shown, the bulk of the trading is concentrated in options with maturity up to 30 days. Furthermore, we differentiate between the trading in puts versus calls, which is motivated by the feature that the returns of puts exhibit more positive skewness than the returns of calls (see, e.g., Bondarenko (2003, Table 2) ). Our goal is to test whether η 1 < 0.
One key observation from Table 10 is that a large jackpot reduces trading in puts and calls with moneyness −0.02 ≤ y t < 0. The importance of this result stems from the fact that a long position in puts and calls resembles a straddle, reflecting a play on return volatility. We also find that the decline in number of contracts traded in puts is more pronounced than those traded in calls on large jackpot days. Furthermore, the p-values and magnitudes of the large jackpot dummy for options with moneyness −0.06 ≤ y t < −0.04 sharply contrast those for options with moneyness −0.02 ≤ y t < 0.
We also explore trading in options with moneyness −0.02 ≤ y t < 0 and those with moneyness −0.06 ≤ y t < −0.04 simultaneously in an SUR setting. Our Throughout, the moneyness of put (call) option is defined as y t ≡ log(K/S t ) (y t ≡ log(S t /K)), where S t is the current level of the index and K is the strike price. Estimation results are based on the OLS specification
where V o t is the daily number of contracts traded for (1) puts and calls, (2) puts only, and (3) calls only. We report the coefficient on the large jackpot dummy, its two-sided p-value, and the corresponding average trading volume. Panel A pertains to options with maturity up to 30 days, and panel B pertains to options with maturity up to 45 days for each of the three out-of-the-money categories. The "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD, and log(V o [t−22→t−1] ) is the corresponding option trading during [t −22 → t −1] prior to day t. As before, our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . To save space, we only report the coefficient on the large jackpot dummy. There are 1,989 daily observations from 2002 to 2009. evidence from the χ 2 test reveals that the magnitude of the large jackpot dummy for options with moneyness −0.02 ≤ y t < 0 is significantly more negative than one for options with moneyness −0.06 ≤ y t < −0.04 (for example, the unreported p-value of χ 2 statistic with puts and calls is 0.02). In conclusion, we show that a substitution effect between lotteries and puts and calls (and puts alone) prevails in a derivatives market. Whereas (Boyer and Vorkink, 2014, Tables IV and VIII) provide evidence that options could be perceived as lotteries, we provide an additional insight that some investors may trade options for fun and excitement.
Our Evidence Refutes the Financial Risk Exposure Hypothesis
The financial risk exposure hypothesis offers an alternative explanation for the decline in trading volume on large jackpot days. The additional implication is that a large jackpot will lead individual investors to reduce their buy volume more than sell volume in stocks.
To examine the financial risk exposure hypothesis, we adopt the following empirical specification: [t−22→t−1] are the averages of individual buy volume and sell volume between day t −22 to t −1.
The financial risk exposure hypothesis implies that β ), suggesting that there is little difference in the decline in trading volume of buying and selling stocks on a large jackpot day. Akin to the phenomenon that day traders derive fun from "playing" the stock market, we find that buying and selling appear to be similarly gratifying dimensions of trading stocks to some individual investors, and this evidence favors the fun and excitement hypothesis.
Possible Ramifications of the Substitution Effect
Here, we explore two ramifications of the substitution effect: (1) Does the decline of trading volume in stocks translate into lower liquidity on large jackpot days? (2) Are there pricing effects associated with the substitution between stock trading and lottery participation?
Stock liquidity deteriorates on large jackpot days
We employ the closing bid-ask spread to measure stock liquidity because the TWSE operates in a consolidated limit order book environment (only limit orders are accepted). The closing bid (ask) price is the highest bid price (lowest ask price) among all the unmatched orders in the closing call auction. Throughout, the closing bid-ask spread is the closing ask minus the closing bid, divided by the closing price. 
The dependent variables, log(V Buy H,t ) and log(V Sell H,t ), are the log of the shares bought and sold by individual investors, respectively. The "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . We report the χ 2 statistics (with one degree of freedom) along with the two-sided p-values for the hypothesis that H 0 : β . Each skewness measure is computed based on daily returns over a three-month trailing window, and we construct the corresponding buy and sell trading volume series.
To study the impact of a large jackpot on the average closing bid-ask spread and trading activities of individual investors simultaneously, we estimate the following SUR specification:
For the high group of each stock characteristic, S H,t is the average of the closing bid-ask spread, V H,t is the number of shares traded by individual investors, S H, [t−22→t−1] is the average of the bid-ask spread between day t −22 to t −1, and V H, [t−22→t−1] is the average trading volume by individual investors between day t −22 to t −1.
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Evidence from Repeated Natural Experiments In all calculations, the closing bid-ask spread is the closing ask minus the closing bid, divided by the closing price, and is the average within each group of stocks. Reported results are based on the SUR specification for the system of equations:
The dependent variables, S H,t and V H,t , are the bid-ask spread and the log of shares traded by individual investors, respectively. The "large jackpot dummy" equals unity if the lottery jackpot exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . Each skewness measure is computed based on daily returns over a three-month trailing window, and we calculate the corresponding average closing bid-ask spread. There are 1,989 daily observations over the sample period of 2002 to 2009.
As evidenced by the positive γ H,1 estimates in Table 12 , less trading is associated with a significant increase in the average bid-ask spread, with seven out of the eight p-values below 0.05. For example, the bid-ask spread increases by 2.7 basis points for stocks with high conventional skewness on a large jackpot day. At the same time, we note that the β H,1 estimates are in the same ballpark as those in Tables 2 and 3. Our results are amenable to the interpretation that the presence of individual investors who enjoy trading is likely to improve the stock market liquidity. This result is consistent with Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008, Section V) , who argue that individual investors provide liquidity to institutions that require immediacy. Furthermore, the closing bid-ask spread could proxy for the asymmetric information component of the average trading cost, given that the TWSE has no specialist. These results imply an exacerbation of the asymmetric information costs when some individual investors choose not to trade on a large jackpot day.
Large jackpots do not produce pricing effects
Prompted by our findings that individual trading volume declines in stocks on large jackpot days and is accompanied by declines in liquidity, we ask one related question: do large jackpots have pricing effects? Stated differently, do trading strategies that attempt to exploit the substitution effect yield economically significant returns? An answer to this could shed light on the efficiency of the stock market in Taiwan. A possible rationale behind the trading strategy is that if some investors trade less in stocks on a large jackpot day, one would expect these stocks to be underpriced. To execute this trading strategy, we take a long position in the high group of a stock characteristic and compute the cumulative returns of this position over a holding period of one day, five days, ten days, 15 days, and 22 days. Our objective is to evaluate whether any potential mispricing can lead to a profitable trading strategy.
We perform the following OLS regressions analogous to Hodrick (1992, Equation (1) 5,10,15,22, (10) where log(1+r t+k,k ) ≡ log(1+r t+1 )+...+log(1+r t+k ) represents the cumulative returns of the high group. Equation (10) is suitable for understanding whether the trading strategy implemented on large jackpot days is profitable relative to other days. Panel A of Table 13 reports the ψ 1,k estimates, along with the p-values based on the HAC standard errors (the Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors accounting for overlapping observations yield similar inference). The key conclusion is that the ψ 1,k coefficients are both statistically insignificant and economically small. Furthermore, the results from this strategy appear indistinguishable from those of a counterpart strategy that invests in the TWSE benchmark index (as reported in the final column).
We elaborate on the above findings in two other ways. First, we pursue another trading strategy in which we symmetrically short the low group among our stock characteristics. Panel B of Table 13 indicates that even if we ignore the exchange's mandated constraints on short positions, the large jackpot dummy coefficient is still indistinguishable from zero. Second, we adopt alternative threshold levels of jackpot sizes ranging from 400 million TWD to 700 million TWD and still observe the insignificance of the large jackpot dummy coefficients (unreported to save space). In summary, our exercises suggest that large jackpots do not induce reliable pricing effects.
Concluding Remarks
This paper hypothesizes that individual investors trade stocks as a fun and exciting gambling activity. We study repeated natural experiments of Table 13 Large jackpots and price effects large jackpot lotteries in Taiwan and investigate whether individual investors substitute buying lottery tickets for buying and selling stocks and hence trade less on large jackpot days. Specifically, when the jackpot exceeds 500 million Taiwan dollars, we find that the trading volume by individual investors decreases between 5.2% and 9.1% among stocks preferred by individual investors and between 6.8% and 8.6% among lottery-like stocks. The substitution effect between stocks and lotteries is robust among stocks with high skewness, as opposed to those with high variance. Furthermore, large jackpots negatively impact the trading volume of lottery-like stocks after accounting for variance, suggesting that the skewness is an important determinant of the substitution effect. Taken all together, our empirical evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that some individual investors treat trading as a fun and exciting gambling activity.
Additional exercises further support that investors may trade stocks for fun and excitement. First, the substitution effect remains robust when we adopt different cutoff values of a large jackpot. Second, a large jackpot significantly reduces individual trading across a large number of firms as well as the aggregate trading activities by individual investors. Third, we consider a major baseball game as an alternative attention-grabbing event and do not find a substitution effect between stocks and baseball games. Finally, large jackpots significantly reduce the number of contracts traded in options that exhibit high sensitivity to return volatility.
We also study the implications of the financial risk exposure hypothesis, which states that when a large jackpot induces some investors to buy lottery tickets, they reduce their buy volume more than their sell volume in stocks. Inconsistent with the financial risk exposure hypothesis, our empirical tests indicate that the decline in individual buy volume is statistically indistinguishable from the decline in sell volume. The evidence that buying a stock is as gratifying as selling a stock is consistent with our hypothesis that individual investors trade stocks for fun and excitement.
Given our Taiwan evidence, can one extrapolate that investors might also trade stocks as a form of a fun and exciting gambling activity in other countries and stock markets? While it may not be feasible to replicate the setting of Taiwan, similar effects may apply in other countries. Meanwhile, evidence is accumulating that psychological attributes such as gambling, sensationseeking, and entertainment can impact individual investors trading behavior in the United States, (e.g., Kumar 2009), in Finland (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009) , and in Germany (Dorn and Sengmueller 2009) . All results are based on the SUR specification for the system of equations:
The dependent variable is the log of the shares traded by individual investors, and the "large sales dummy," D Sales t , equals unity if the lottery sales exceed 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . The last column reports the χ 2 statistics (with one degree of freedom) and the corresponding two-sided p-values for the hypothesis H 0 : β H,1 = β L,1 versus H A : β H,1 <β L,1 . Each skewness measure is computed based on daily returns over a three-month trailing window, and we construct the corresponding trading volume as in Table 3 .
Appendix B. Selection of Stocks That Are Fun and Exciting to Trade
We construct several measures of how much a stock characteristic is preferred by individual investors.
(1) Individual trading fraction: The number of shares traded by individual investors divided by the total number of shares traded. If a stock's average individual trading fraction between day t −22 to t −1 is in the top (bottom) 30th percentile, we classify this stock as a high (low) individual trading fraction stock on day t.
(2) Past returns: This is measured by the average return between day t −22 to t −1. Stocks with high (low) past returns on day t are those that fall in the top (bottom) 30th percentile.
(3) Reciprocal of market capitalization: Stocks falling in the high group on day t are those in the lowest 30th percentile of average capitalization between day t −22 to t −1. The other end of the reciprocal of market capitalization is analogously defined.
(4) Reciprocal of earnings per share (EPS): Stocks falling in the high group on day t are those in the lowest 30th percentile of EPS, including those with negative EPS. The EPS are those reported at the end of the fiscal quarter that is six months prior to day t. This table reports the results using an expanding scheme following Clark and West (2007) . The full sample results are shown in bold for comparison. Estimation results are based on the SUR specification for the system of equations:
The dependent variable is the log of the shares traded by individual investors, and the "large jackpot dummy," D J ackpot t , equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The twosided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . We also report the χ 2 statistics (with one degree of freedom) and the corresponding two-sided p-values for the hypothesis H 0 : β H,1 = β L,1 versus H A : β H,1 <β L,1 . Each skewness measure is computed based on daily returns over a three-month trailing window, and we construct the corresponding trading volume as in Table 3. (5) Market-to-Book (M/B): Stocks falling in the high group on day t are those in the highest 30th percentile of M/B. The M/B is the average market capitalization over the past one week divided by the book value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter that is six months prior to day t. Firms with negative book value of equity are excluded.
Our choice of stock characteristics is in line with earlier studies, for example, Gompers and Metrick (2001, Table IV) , who observe that institutional investors are more inclined to trade stocks that are larger, more liquid, and with relatively low past returns. The investigations by Hirshleifer (2001) , Barber and Odean (2008) , and Foucault, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) provide additional motivation for our choice of stock characteristics. Important to our study, Table Online-II shows Estimation results are based on the SUR specification for the system of equations:
The dependent variables, log(V Inst H,t ) and log(V Inst L,t ), are the log of the shares traded by institutional investors, and the "large jackpot dummy," D J ackpot t , equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . Each skewness measure is computed based on daily returns over a three-month trailing window, and we construct the corresponding institutional trading volume.
that a common feature associated with stocks preferred by individual investors is that they deliver more skewed returns.
We employ stocks with high skewness to depict lottery-like stocks (see also Kumar (2009 Kumar ( , hypothesis H1, page 1894 and references therein). Our analysis considers three skewness measures, namely, conventional skewness, the mean minus the median divided by the standard deviation (the Pearson's median skewness coefficient), and up-to-down volatility (the negative of DUVOL it in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001, Equation (2))). The correlation between the daily trading volume series that corresponds to conventional skewness and Pearson's median skewness coefficient (upto-down volatility) is 0.85 (0.91).
Appendix C. Robustness of the Substitution Effect between Stocks and Lotteries
The ensuing exercises highlight the robustness of the substitution effect.
C1. Lottery Sales Complement Our Evidence from the Lottery Jackpot
Do we obtain a similar adverse impact of the lottery on stock trading if one employs lottery sales, instead of the jackpot, to define a salient and attractive lottery? Pursuing a specification analogous to Equation (1), Table A2 presents SUR estimation results featuring a large lottery sales dummy, The departure from Table 9 is that we employ the "Baseball game day dummy," D Baseball t , instead of the large jackpot dummy. D Baseball t equals unity if there is a major baseball game on day t and zero otherwise. In our sample, there are 90 major baseball games, including those of professional leagues, regional and international championships, and the Olympics. We hand-collected the data from http://twbsball.dils.tku.edu.tw. The reported estimation results are based on the OLS specification: where log(V m,t ) is either the log of shares traded in the aggregate (panel A), the log of the total value traded (panel B), or the log of the turnover (panel C), all by individual investors. We calculate the individual turnover as the number of shares traded by individual investors divided by the number of shares outstanding. V m, [t−22→t−1] is the average trading activity of individual investors in the market during [t −22 → t −1] prior to day t. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994) . The "large jackpot dummy," D
J ackpot t
, equals unity if the jackpot size exceeds 500 million TWD. Our controls include day-of-the-week dummies, the log changes in the unemployment rate, and the log changes in the coincident index. The two-sided p-values (reported in parentheses) are calculated using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator with automatically selected lag, as in Newey and West (1994 that is, when total sales per lottery drawing exceeds 500 million TWD. We interpret the negative and statistically significant estimates for the large lottery sales dummy as offering complimentary evidence in favor of the fun and excitement hypothesis. However, we are aware of the stylized fact that demand for lotteries typically increases in bad economic times (e.g., Mikesell (1994 , Table 1 ) and Kumar (2009, Section I.A) ). Such a feature could elicit concerns about a lead-lag relation between the lottery sales and stock trading. We have handled such a potential concern in two ways. First, we have incorporated macroeconomic controls in our specifications. Second, we use the setting of natural experiments of large jackpot lotteries.
One may additionally argue that if investors treat the lottery and the stock market as alternative gambling venues, they may purchase fewer lottery tickets in response to large return realizations in stocks. To examine the implication that large return realizations could reduce lottery expenditure, we consider the regression: log(Lottery Sales t )= λ 0 +λ 1 ×Large Returns t +controls+e t . In our illustration, large return movements on day t are captured by (1/N ) N n=1 r 2 n,t , where r n,t is the return of stock n on day t and N is the number of stocks in the high group of a stock characteristic. Table Online -IV shows that lottery sales are negatively associated with our measure of large return movements. Specifically, λ 1 estimates are negative and statistically significant (six out of eight p-values are below 0.05 and seven are below 0.1). The substitution effect (i.e., λ 1 < 0) inherent in this exercise appears consistent with our interpretation that some individual investors may trade stocks for fun and excitement.
C2. The Substitution Effect Holds Despite Shifting Macroeconomic Conditions
Does the substitution effect persist under good and bad macroeconomic environments? We investigate the connection between large jackpot lotteries and individual trading activities from 2002 to 2005, whereby the four-year initial sample is selected to smooth out any noise in the SUR estimations. Then we exploit an expanding scheme (as advocated by Clark and West (2007, Section 3) ) to study the fun and excitement hypothesis through the passage of time. The consistency of the substitution effect in an expanding scheme is important, as it mitigates the concern that bad economic times are associated with more lottery sales, which can feed into the jackpot (Kumar (2009, Section I.A) ). Table A3 reports the SUR estimation results (corresponding to the specification in Equation (1) 
